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Abstract
We present Kaleidoscope an innovative system that supports
live forensics for application performance problems caused
by either individual component failures or resource con-
tention issues in large-scale distributed storage systems. The
design of Kaleidoscope is driven by our study of I/O failures
observed in a peta-scale storage system anonymized as Peta-
Store. Kaleidoscope is built on three key features: 1) using
temporal and spatial differential observability for end-to-end
performance monitoring of I/O requests, 2) modeling the
health of storage components as a stochastic process using
domain-guided functions that accounts for path redundancy
and uncertainty in measurements, and, 3) observing differ-
ences in reliability and performance metrics between similar
types of healthy and unhealthy components to attribute the
most likely root causes. We deployed Kaleidoscope on PetaS-
tore and our evaluation shows that Kaleidoscope can run live
forensics at 5-minute intervals and pinpoint the root causes
of 95.8% of real-world performance issues, with negligible
monitoring overhead.
1 Introduction
Large-scale storage services are typically implemented on
top of clusters of servers and disk arrays to provide high per-
formance (e.g., load balancers and congestion control) as well
as high availability (e.g., RAID, and active-active high avail-
ability server pairs). Component failures [24, 28, 39, 40, 72]
and resource contention [19, 41] are chronic problems that
lead to I/O timeouts and slowdown in such systems. State-
of-the-art solutions focus on reliability failures (e.g., Deep-
View [77] and Panorama [33]) and hence, do not attempt
to distinguish between resource contention and component
failures in storage systems. We assert that knowing whether
a problem is due to resource contention or component/n-
ode/subsystem failure is critical in effectively coordinating
a recovery strategy. For example, in the case of component
failures, an immediate repair action must be taken to avoid
failures during fail-over and recovery [18, 35, 49]. In the case
of resource contention, a solution may involve load balanc-
ing and throttling of excessive I/O requests generated by
applications (as well as restructure the code).
A combination of component failures and contention is-
sues significantly degrades application performance in pro-
duction settings (see §3). This paper uses a combination of
proactivemonitoring andmachine learning to jointly address
the above issues. We have incorporated the proposed tech-
niques into an automated tool called Kaleidoscope. Our tool
has been demonstrated in live traffic on a production system
to 1) locate components (e.g., data servers and RAID devices)
causing I/O bottlenecks (i.e., I/O slowdown or timeouts),
2) differentiate between a reliability failure and a resource
contention issue, and 3) quantify the negligible impact on
the system performance while delivering high precision and
recall, as discussed later in this section.
To support failure detection and live forensics, Kaleido-
scope uses the following novel techniques:
• Proactive monitoring. Kaleidoscope monitors the end-
to-end performance of a storage system using Store-Pings,
a set of monitor primitives that cover all the storage op-
erations involved in serving a client’s I/O requests (e.g.,
create, read, write, and delete files). Store-Ping monitors
are strategically placed to provide both spatial and tempo-
ral differential observability in real time.
• Modeling and inferring component health.The health
of a component in a storage system (e.g., a metadata server
or a RAID device) is modeled as a stochastic process that
accounts for uncertainty (due to performance variability
and asynchrony) as well as non-determinism in distributed
storage systems. We built a system model by using the
factor graph (FG) formalization, which infers component
health by ingesting the monitoring data collected by Store-
Pings. The inference on the model allows Kaleidoscope to
localize unhealthy components in near real-time.
• Methods to determine the cause of I/O failures. A set
of statistical methods (including a local outlier factor [17]
algorithm run using data on server load, disk load, and disk
bandwidth utilization) and clustering [68] of storage sys-
tem error logs are used to distinguish between component
failures and resource overloads. The statistical methods
are based on comparison of reliability and performance
metrics (such as the number of active processes on a data
server) as they are collected for healthy and unhealthy
components. Note that the distinction between healthy
and unhealthy components is provided by the FG-based
model discussed above.
Deployment. Kaleidoscope has been deployed on PetaS-
tore, a 36 PB production system, which employs the Lustre
file system [3]. Lustre is used by more than 70% of the top 100
supercomputers [4] and is offered by cloud service vendors
such as Amazon and Azure [8, 11]. Its design resembles that
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Figure 1. Common patterns of I/O failures. Notation: "hb" is heart-
beat process, "srv" is service process; and each box represents the
storage components (e.g., data servers).
of many other object-based POSIX storage systems, such as
IBM GPFS [61], BeeGFS [31], Ceph [73], and GlusterFS [16].
Monitoring overhead. Store-Ping-basedmonitors have been
deployed on PetaStore for two years. The monitors measure
the completion times of 5,382 I/O requests per minute and
cover every I/O path from any client to a RAID device. Since
Store-Pings actively collect data at 60-second intervals, we
measured the overhead introduced by Store-Ping monitors
on the production system and found the overhead to be less
than 0.01% on the peak I/O throughput of PetaStore.
Forensic effectiveness. We used two years of monitoring
data collected by Store-Ping monitors to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of Kaleidoscope’s live forensics. The evaluation is
based on 843 production issues identified and resolved by
the PetaStore operators in this period as the ground truth.
Overall Kaleidoscope:
• correctly localizes the component failures (e.g., a specific
data server or a RAID device) and resource overloads for
99.3% of cases.
• accurately identifies likely root cause for 95.8% of cases,
i.e. disambiguates between resource contention and com-
ponent failures.
• is configured, in PetaStore, to run data collection at one-
minute intervals and produce forensics at 5 minute inter-
vals. Our results indicate that Kaleidoscope can collect and
produce forensics using 100 monitors at 30 second interval
with marginal impact of 2.42% on the peak throughput.
Detection method Failure PatternsP1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Basic heartbeat ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Service-aware heartbeat ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
Client-view observation D D D ✗ ✗
Kaleidoscope ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1. Failure patterns and the capability of different types of
failure detection. ✓: can detect the failure; ✗: cannot detect the
failure; D: the failure is detected only if the client is affected.
2 Motivation and Goals
Weaddress the following failure patterns 1 that are frequently
experienced in large-scale distributed storage systems [12,
24, 34] such as PetaStore (§3), as illustrated in Figure 1:
• P1: Fail-stop failures of an entire storage component (e.g.,
crash of data server) [21, 71] ;
• P2: Fail-stop failures of a service process or a thread in
the storage component [46];
• P3: Gray failures [33, 34] that are visible to the application
(e.g., an I/O timeout) but not to the failure detectors. They
occur because of differential observability;
• P4: Fail-slow failures in which the built-in redundancy
masks the failures from applications, but results in in-
creased I/O response time [53, 74–76];
• P5: Fail-slow failures due to high loads or contention in
which the storage system takes more time to service an
I/O request because of contention but does not lead to I/O
timeout [22, 43].
Our goal is to detect those issues and provide live forensic
support to localize unhealthy components and pinpoint root
causes. In large-scale storage systems (§3.2), failures with
the above different patterns often manifest through similar
symptoms known as I/O failures; an I/O request is considered
to have "failed" if it has not been serviced within an expected
amount of time. The difficulty of distinguishing causes from
symptoms often results in a lengthy troubleshooting process
and significantly prolongs failure recovery. (different failure
patterns require different recovery strategies.)
2.1 The State of the Art
In the following, we show that the state-of-the-art approaches
are fundamentally limited in dealing with the aforemen-
tioned failure patterns that commonly occur in the field, es-
pecially in distributed storage systems. Table 1 summarizes
three different classes of existing approaches and compares
them with our Kaleidoscope approach. We focus on failure
detection in the rest of this section, but we would like to note
that Kaleidoscope is beyond a failure detector; it provides
end-to-end live forensics to pinpoint root causes.
1[10] provides a taxonomy of failure patterns.
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We classify existing failure detection methods into three
categories: (1) basic heartbeats [30, 71] in which a dedicated
heartbeat process running on each component indicates the
status (UP or DOWN) of the component; (2) service-aware heart-
beats [23, 38, 44, 46] in which the heartbeat process validates
the liveness and functional correctness of the services 2;
and (3) client view observations [33, 77] in which failures are
detected based on the observations of the clients.
As shown in Table 1, heartbeat-based methods are insuffi-
cient. Ideally, service-aware heartbeats can report the pre-
cise status of a component; however, it is hard to check the
fine-grained functionality of each component, since they are
typically implementation-specific. Moreover, a component
could depend on many other components, making it hard to
scale. Client-view observation can close the gaps of differen-
tial observability, but it cannot deal with failure patterns that
have not manifested as external, client-perceivable issues
such as Patterns 4 and 5. On the other hand, our study in §3.2
shows that Patterns 4 and 5 are among the biggest threats
to availability and performance in large-scale distributed
storage systems. Kaleidoscope is designed to address all the
failure patterns in Table 1.
We argue that the common practices of failure detection
(as discussed above) do not consider the inter-relation be-
tween reliability and performance. However, as we demon-
strate in this paper, the ability to differentiate between com-
ponent failures and resource overloads is of vital importance.
2.2 Principles
To meet the requirements of proactive failure detection and
live forensics, we employed several design principles that
are crucial to the success of Kaleidoscope:
• Observability. We focus on enhancing observability to
achieve fast failure detection and live forensics from both
the client’s and the server’s views. The client-view helps
us detect user-perceived I/O failures, while the server-veiw
helps us pinpoint the root causes on the server side. The
view points are both spatial (across clients) and temporal
(in time series).
• Dealing with uncertainty. Failure detection and foren-
sics have to take into account the uncertainty introduced
by the complexity of the production environment (e.g.,
random path selection) and noise associated with mea-
surements (e.g., transient delay in I/O packets).
• Automation.We aim to create a fully automated and un-
supervised system that can work with massive and imper-
fect production data. Tools are less useful if they require
manual classification and reasoning.
• Localization support.We aim to localize the unhealthy
components that lead to the detected I/O failures. We find
that aggregation of the client-side observations offers great
2Any basic heartbeat can be converted to service-aware heartbeats.
opportunities for effective localization, because a misbe-
having component often affects multiple clients.
• Identifying root causes. We find a strong need to pin-
point the root cause of I/O failures in real time, because
recovery strategies are based on root causes. Distinguish-
ing a) I/O failures caused by component failures and b)
resource overloads would be particularly useful.
• Lowoverhead. Fault tolerance and forensics cannot affect
or interfere with the performance of the normal workloads.
3 Understanding Failures
Kaleidoscope is driven by insights from the daily operations
of a petascale distributed storage system anonymized as
PetaStore and the analysis of production failures at PetaStore.
3.1 PetaStore
PetaStore is designed for large-scale, high-performance com-
puting with I/O intensive workloads, such as machine learn-
ing and large-scale simulations. PetaStore consists of 6 man-
agement servers, 6 metadata servers, 420 data servers, and
582 I/O forwarding nodes (LNET nodes). The storeage servers
in PetaStore are connected via an internal Infiniband net-
work, serving 28,000+ computing nodes (as clients).
PetaStore uses the Lustre distributed file system tomanage
36 PB disk space across 17,280 disk devices. The disks are
arranged in grid RAID [32], and referred as object storage
devices (OSDs).
Lustre implements a loadable Linux kernel module in-
stalled in every computing node for POSIX compliance. The
computing nodes are diskless: all I/O operations go by RPC
to the LNET nodes, and the LNET nodes control the storage
access with direct connections. LNET nodes act as virtual
switches connecting two different network fabrics: a propri-
etary network connecting compute nodes, and an Infiniband
network connecting storage servers.
PetaStore employs the following reliability mechanisms.
High availability (HA) PetaStore’s HA features are based
on server mirroring and data replication, including:
• active-active HA pairs for data servers;
• active-passive HA pairs for both metadata and man-
agement servers;
• active-passive for RAID disk devices (OSDs).
When a server failure is detected by the partner server, the
partner server in the HA pair kills the failed server, mounts
the failed server’s OSDs, and takes over the failed server’s
load (to prevent data inconsistencies due to “split brains”).
Imperative recovery A fail-over triggers a soft restart on
the clients that are maintaining connections with the failed
server; after that the management server updates a status
table mounted at each client. With imperative recovery, the
management server actively informs the clients about the
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failure to force the clients to reload the table and reconnect
to the target nodes, instead of waiting for an RPC timeout.
Transaction-based recovery. PetaStoremakes the failover
process transparent to storage clients by using transaction-
based recovery. Each client maintains a transaction log. If a
server fails, the clients automatically reconnect to the new
server and replay transactions that were not committed prior
to the failure, in order to recover the lost state.
RAID. PetaStore uses RAID for disk reliability. The meta-
data and management servers are equipped with RAID 1+0
disk volumes, and the data servers are equipped with multi-
ple RAID 6 volumes (for storing data blocks) and one RAID
1 volume shared between the HA pairs (for journaling and
state maintenance). Each volume has two or more hot spares.
3.2 Failure Characteristics
Next, we provide characterization of storage-related failures,
which include storage component failures and I/O request
failures, observed in PetaStore in 23 months between Jan. 1,
2017 and Nov. 30, 2018.
3.2.1 Component Failures
PetaStore-related failures cause service disruption and un-
availability. For example, in 2018, such failures accounted for
64.4% (1,175,082 node-hours) of total lost node-hours. The
total lost node-hours in 2018 was only 0.74% (1,825,870 node-
hours) of total possible operational hours (of 246,369,160).
0.74% is substantial for large-scale data center due to loss
of large amounts of compute time; in this case, roughly
contributing to 32 million core-hours. Table 2 gives a fine-
grained categorization of the storage-related failures in three
different failure domains, as follows.
Client. An I/O failure can be caused by failures of a Lustre
client module. A typical failure mode of a Lustre client mod-
ule is to hang or crash because of software bugs. Software
bugs can impact multiple clients at the same time. In the
past, a bug in the lock management running on the clients
has led to simultaneous failures of hundreds of clients.
Networks. Network failures lead to unreachability of stor-
age server; thus leading to I/O failures. We categorize net-
work failures into three sub-domains: 1) failures of compute-
side networks that connect compute nodes, 2) failures of
storage networks that connect storage servers, and 3) fail-
ures of LNET nodes. There were 262, 7, and 6 failures in those
categories respectively. In PetaStore, failures of a network
component (e.g., switches) require updating routing paths.
Storage servers. We find that failures in the domain of the
storage servers tend to be more severe and long-lasting, than
client/network failures. In total, fail-stop failures led to five
system-wide outages and multiple partial outages that af-
fected a subset of applications. Although most of the storage
Domain Failed component # Incidents
Client Lustre client daemons 74
Network Compute-side network links/switches 262
Network LNET nodes 6
Network Storage ToR switch and links 7
Storage OS/Software 11
Storage Server HW (CPU/Memory/Fan/PSU/...) 17
Storage Disk drive failures 295
Table 2. Component failures that affected application I/O incidents.
Only ten of them caused system-wide outages (five network-wide
outages and five storage-wide outages).
server failures were handled through the HA features, we
found that certain fail-over procedures took significantly
more time to fail-over than usual (several minutes and even
hours), leading to partial or complete unavailability of the
storage system. (two such procedures are described in §3.4.)
PetaStore experienced 295 disk failures. Most of them were
handled by RAID; however, in 6 of 295 cases, disk-drive fail-
ures triggered software bugs (5 cases) or there was 1 RAID
array failure. In those 6 cases, PetaStore experienced partial
system outages: hundreds of applications could not connect
to the storage system during the failure.
Only a very small percentage (0.057%) of component fail-
ures cause system-wide outages. The vast majority of com-
ponent failures lead to partial system outages or perfor-
mance issues.
3.3 I/O Failures
We define an I/O failure as a failure of an I/O request to
be serviced in the expected time (according to service-level
agreements). From the application’s point of view, a late I/O
response is no different from a failed I/O response—both of
them cause the application I/O to timeout. In PetaStore, I/O
requests are expected to complete within one second.
3.3.1 I/O Failures Caused by Component Failures
We find that the most common manifestation of component
failures is performance degradation that leads to I/O failures.
For example, disk failure is transparently tolerated by the
RAID array; however, disk failures trigger RAID resyncs
on hot-spare disks to protect the RAID array from future
failures. Such a resync or periodic scrubbing of a RAID array
takes away a certain amount of bandwidth for an extended
period of time, ranging from 4 to 12 hours, and that leads to
an increase in completion time of I/O requests.
Using Kaleidoscope, we find that I/O requests during fail-
stop component failures (those that do not lead to outages)
increase the average completion time of I/O requests by as
much as 52.7× compared to the average I/O completion time
in failure-free scenarios. Similarly, the 99th percentile of com-
pletion times of I/O requests is as high as 31 seconds (I/O
requests timeout) due to fail-stop failures. Figure 2 shows the
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difference between I/O request completion times under com-
ponent failures and without failures (labeled as “normal”).
Component failures have significant performance impact
in terms of I/O completion time.
3.3.2 I/O Failures Caused by Resource Overloads
We find that resource overloads are a frequent root cause of
I/O failures. For a quantitative study, we used disk service
time, returned by iostat as await, as a measure of the load
on disk devices. await measures the average time from the
beginning to the end of requests, including device queuing
and the actual time to service the I/O request on the disk
device. await is different from I/O completion time, which
includes the traversal time between the client and the disk
device. Note that anomalies in disk service time could have
different causes, such as disk errors, extreme I/O requests
that content for blocks on a specific disk, and high load that
exhausts hyper-threads.
Fig. 3 shows a histogram of disk service time (await) in
seconds returned by iostat using an event-driven measure-
ment (which is triggered only when loadavg [1] exceeds 50,
to avoid intrusive behavior). We can see from Fig. 3 that such
anomalies occur frequently. Specifically, we found 14,081
such unique events by clustering the per-disk continuous
data points in time with service times longer than 1 second.
Extreme IO. Extremely high number of I/O requests create
high load on the server and lead to high disk contention.
Such unintentional extreme usage of storage systems cause
performance and stability problems. Fig. 4 shows a histogram
of the durations of extreme I/O requests by applications to
the indexing server. The durations of high I/O requests are
generally small (lasting less than 10 seconds); however, there
is a long tail of applications that send high I/O requests
for hours, as seen in Figure 4. For example, in one case, an
application caused high load on the metadata server. The
application opened and closed 75,479,396,602 files in a span
of 4 hours, and issued 20,000 I/O requests per second. During
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Figure 5. Correlation between load (measured by loadavg) and
latency. (“Comp. T.” is the completion time of I/O requests.)
that time, the loadavg increased from 60 to as high as 350.
The 50th and 99th percentile durations of extreme I/O were
found to be 12 and 227 minutes, respectively.
High load. I/O request completion time increases with the
load on the storage servers. High load conditions are caused
by a flood of I/O requests on a storage server either 1) by one
application (cf. extreme IO), or 2) by multiple applications
that are competing for a shared resource. Figure 5 shows the
histogram of load across all servers; this graph also shows
the average completion time and the 99th percentile comple-
tion time of I/O requests (i.e., latency) at different storage
server load values. Overall, we can see a strong relation-
ship between an increase in load and the completion time
of I/O requests. At high load (loadavg of 350), the average
I/O request completion time increases to 1 second, and the
99th percentile I/O request completion time increases to 10
seconds. The mean I/O completion time increased 7× under
high load (i.e., loadavg > 64).
Resource overloads (due to extreme I/O behavior or high
load) are a frequent root cause of I/O failures.
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3.4 Long Tail of Zero-day Failures
At the PetaStore scale, failures with recurring patterns have
all been addressed by building specific solutions over time.
For example, imperative recovery (§3.1) has been deployed
in response to slow recovery and timeout of I/O transac-
tions, and preemptive disk replacement has been adopted to
prevent concurrent disk failures and reduce recovery time.
On the other hand, we have found a long tail of failures
that do not have common patterns and are hard to antici-
pate; we call them zero-day failures (analogous to zero-day
vulnerabilities) [52].
We analyzed issue tickets and found that there were four
new issues on average per month. The following describes
two cases of zero-day failures, which by definition are rare.
Failures of failure recovery. PetaStore has experienced
multiple failures of failure recovery throughout its lifetime.
The failures inevitably led to unavailability of the largest
partition on PetaStore for several hours. The management
server (MGS) detected that the active metadata server (MDS-
A) was not responding because of a software bug that had
led to a hang. Ten minutes later, after several retries MGS
declared the MDS-A as unreachable. 22 minutes after MGS
had detected a problem in the MDS-A, and launched the fail-
over procedure by which the active standbyMDS-B mounted
MDS-A volumes and triggered imperative recovery. During
the mounting process, the RAID array was found to have
errors which triggered a background reconstruction process
that used a hot spare. Because of the RAID reconstruction,
the recovery of client transactions timed out, causing client
eviction. 150 minutes later, the RAID array reconstruction,
combined with high I/O requests, overloaded MDS-B and
caused the whole storage partition to become unavailable.
During the 4 hours of this case, the whole file system parti-
tion provided a degraded service for about an hour and was
unreachable for the remaining 3 hours. During that outage,
jobs running on 8,346 compute nodes were interrupted.
Failures of LNET nodes. LNET nodes serve as bridge de-
vices between computing nodes and storage servers. A re-
quest from a client to an OSD (a RAID disk device) can be
served by any one of 4 LNET nodes. For any pair of <client,
OSD>, the group of 4 LNET nodes are fixed and chosen in
round robin when routing a request. A failure of an LNET
node is detected through heartbeats. However, in this case,
an LNET node was found to drop requests passing through it,
causing I/O failures. The LNET node appeared to be alive and
healthy and sending heartbeats to the rest of the components.
Upon investigation, it was found that the LNET had suffered
a software error that caused it to drop I/O requests. The
incident was captured via an application’s own performance
monitoring system. The I/O bandwidth (in MB/sec) for the
applications served by the failed LNET node decreased by
25+% for multiple hours.
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Figure 6.An overview of Kaleidoscope. Kaleidoscope consists three
component for monitoring, failure localization, and failure diagno-
sis (marked in gray).
Many high-impact zero-day failures can be prevented if
the faulty or unhealthy components can be detected and
the corresponding potential causes can be diagnosed ear-
lier, before they lead to user-visible impact.
4 Design and Implementation
Figure 6 shows the overall architecture of Kaleidoscope and
how it fits to a large-scale distributed storage system like
PetaStore. Kaleidoscope has threemain components: 1) proac-
tive monitoring modules for failure detection, 2) failure lo-
calization based on modeling of the health of every storage
component (e.g., metadata server and data server) using the
monitoring data, and 3) a diagnosis module that pinpoints
the root causes of unhealthy storage components that affect
the performance of I/O requests.
Kaleidoscope is a fully automated system. Its design fol-
lows the principle in §2.2. A key emphasis of its design is
the need to be practical and useful for real-world production
storage systems like PetaStore. Its success has been proven
by its deployment at PetaStore since 2017. Kaleidoscope has
been used by PetaStore operators to quickly identify fail-
ing components, perform preemptive replacement, and help
users rewrite application code to avoid extreme I/O.
4.1 Monitoring
Kaleidoscope proactivelymonitors a storage system from the
viewpoint of both the clients and the storage components.
The component view alone is insufficient to reveal and iden-
tify partial, gray failures manifested in complex performance
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anomalies, while the client view alone is insufficient to reveal
the root causes inside the storage subsystem.
4.1.1 Store-Pings
We designed Store-Pings, a set of primitives for measuring
the availability and I/O performance of distributed storage
systems. Store-Pings are analogous to but different from the
ICMP-based network ping. A Store-Ping is a specific I/O
request that traverses all necessary storage components to
complete the I/O request. The API of a Store-Ping is:
store_ping(ost, *io_op, kwargs)
where *io_op is a function pointer to an I/O operation, and
kwargs is the argument for *io_op. Store-Pings use direct
I/O requests to avoid any caching effect into the client mem-
ory, thus ensuring the I/O request’s traversal of the disks on
the data servers.
We designed three types of Store-Pings, CrWr, WrEr, and
RmEx, which represent three different I/O requests:
• CrWr: create and write a file
• WrEx: write to an existing file
• RmEx: remove an existing file
The three types of Store-Pings test all the storage subsystems
involved in ensuring correct and successful I/O operations.
CrWr and RmEx test the functionality of the metadata servers,
whereas WrEx tests the functionality of the data servers (and,
correspondingly, RAID disks). For example, a CrWr requires
two different backend operations to complete: (1) creation
of a file by a metadata server on a random data server (and
the corresponding RAID disks) and adding of the file entry
to the metadata index, and (2) opening and writing of a file
on the data server (and the corresponding RAID disks). The
payload of a write request is as small as 64 bytes.
Store-Pings assume that a monitor can pin files onto a
specific OSD (and hence the data server). File pinning can
be easily supported, as the metadata server has all the data
chunk information. Thus, a file uniquely identifies a data
server for amonitor, and that also helps tominimize variation
in latency measurements (avoiding concurrent Store-Pings
from other monitors). This functionality is used to deter-
ministically test the data servers by using WrEx I/O requests.
Store-Pings do not require pinning of any other nodes (e.g.,
metadata servers).
4.1.2 Store-Ping-Based Monitors
Amonitor continuously executes Store-Pings to measure the
availability and performance of storage components. How-
ever, in order to monitor all storage components (LNETs,
metadata servers, data servers, and OSDs), Kaleidoscope
needs to select the number of Store-Ping monitors and their
placement in the compute network. Store-Ping monitors
should be enabled only on a subset of clients (M out of N
clients whereM << N ) to reduce the overhead of the moni-
toring system and its impact on existing I/O requests. Thus,
selection of the number of Store-Ping monitors, K , and their
placements can be formulated as a constraint optimization
problem: the monitors should achieve the highest coverage
(observability) under the monitoring overhead budget.
In this work, we use network tomography principles [20]
in which the aim is to find unhealthy components in a given
network topology graph G by running tests on subsets of
components, with each test (which is a completion of an I/O
request sent by Store-Pings) indicating whether any compo-
nent in the subset is unhealthy. The subsets of components
that can be tested together are limited by the set of mea-
surement paths P , which are in turn limited by the topology,
probing mechanism, and placement of monitors. Specifically,
the placement of monitors in Kaleidoscope is guided by the
“sufficient identifiability condition” [50], which states that
in a network graph G consisting of both monitor and non-
monitor nodes, any set of up to k failed nodes is identifiable
if for any non-monitor v ∈ G and failure set F with |F | ≤ k
(v < F ), there is a measurement path going through v but no
node in F . Such a method ensures spatial differential observ-
ability. These principles put a restriction on the minimum
number of concurrent failures (in our case, unhealthy com-
ponents), k , that can be detected in the storage system.
4.1.3 Component-Side Monitoring
Store-Pings can be used to infer the health of storage com-
ponents based on client-view observations; however, it does
not provide any information about the root cause of un-
healthy components. Kaleidoscope uses a comprehensive
component monitoring system (Integrated System Console
[66]) to collect status data on different components, includ-
ing I/O statistics (loadavg and I/O requests per second of
data servers, and I/O wait time and utilization of disks) and
logs (error logs and syslogs) of each storage server.
4.2 Failure Localization
Kaleidoscope infers the health state of a storage component
based on Store-Ping monitoring. It addresses the challenges
of 1)measurement noises due to asynchronous and variability
in I/O measurements, and 2) non-determinism due to path
redundancy and randomness in routing/balancing. Our ex-
perience tells us that threshold or voting-based methods are
ineffective, because of the non-linearity that originates in
measurement noise and non-determinism.
Kaleidoscope models health as a stochastic process that
accounts for measurement noise and non-determinism. The
modeling is based on factor graphs (FG) [42], a generalization
of probabilistic graphical models. FGs model the relationship
between component health (random variables) using domain-
guided factor functions (how a component’s health leads
to I/O failures). Factor functions encode 1) the stochastic
nature of measurement noise and variability, and 2) non-
determinism due to path redundancy. FGs only needs small
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samples and outperforms supervised machine learning (e.g.,
regression [69, 77]) with domain-guided factor functions.
In this section, we formalize the modeling and explain
the procedure of using the model to infer the health of the
components, including metadata servers, data servers, I/O
forwarding servers (LNETs), and the storage network.
Modeling. We define the health of a component as the prob-
ability that it will successfully serve an I/O request, denoted
byXi .Xi is sampled from a beta distribution,Xi ∼ Beta(α , β),
to incorporate uncertainty, where α and β determine the
shape of the distribution.3 At any epoch (i.e., at the time of
inference), α and β are updated based on historical informa-
tion up to the current epoch.
Store-Ping-based monitoring provides measurements on
path availability between the two members of each <client,
OSD> pair.We use the random variableYp to denote the num-
ber of observed successful Store-Pings on a path p (a <client,
OSD> pair), and we model Yp using a binomial distribution,
i.e., Yp ∼ Binomial(Ap ,N ), whereAp denotes the availability
of the path p and N denotes the number of Store-Pings sent
by the monitoring system through p.
We leverage the fact that, for a Store-Ping to be successful,
every component on the I/O path must be both available and
reachable from the client. When a Store-Ping takes a unique
path from a client to a OSD, the path availability Ap can be
determined solely by the product of individual component’s
health: Ap =
∏
i ∈pXi .
However, because of the redundancy in a distributed sys-
tem (e.g., the HA pair-based failover), a Store-Ping destined
for an OSD may take a different path. Thus, the path avail-
ability cannot be expressed in terms of each component’s
own availability, but also depend on the availability of the
other redundant components. For example, an I/O request
to an OSD can be routed through one of two data servers
connected to it. Hence, a destination OSD is not reachable if
both of the two data servers connecting to it are not available
or the OSD itself is not available. Rosdi , the probability of
reachability of the OSD, can be determined as:
Rosdi = (1 − (1 − Xds1 ) · (1 − Xds2 )) · Xosdi
where Xds1 and Xds2 denote the health of data servers in the
HA pair associated with the OSD (denoted by osdi ). In this
equation, 1 − Xds1 and 1 − Xds2 determine the probability
distribution of the ds1 and ds2 to be not healthy respectively,
and their product determines the probability distribution of
both being in unhealthy state. The probability distribution,
when multiplied by the probability distribution of the OSD
is health, gives the reachability of the OSD. From Fig. 7, AP
between client C1 and OSD1 is given by:
AP = XC1 · XCN · XSN · XMS1 · Rosd1
3Beta distributions are continuous distribution commonly used as a prior
for Bernoulli random variables. It drastically reduces the computation time
for inference.
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<latexit sha1_base64="JSAlDjHq2PStD07 7wOwBY4hhusg=">AAAB7HicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+Vb0IXoJF8FR2q6DHgh68WdFtC+1Ssmm2D c0mS5IVytLf4MWDIl79Qd78N6btHrT1wcDjvRlm5oUJZ9q47rdTWFldW98obpa2tnd298r7B0 0tU0WoTySXqh1iTTkT1DfMcNpOFMVxyGkrHF1P/dYTVZpJ8WjGCQ1iPBAsYgQbK/l3Dzc9r1e uuFV3BrRMvJxUIEejV/7q9iVJYyoM4VjrjucmJsiwMoxwOil1U00TTEZ4QDuWChxTHWSzYyf o1Cp9FEllSxg0U39PZDjWehyHtjPGZqgXvan4n9dJTXQVZEwkqaGCzBdFKUdGounnqM8UJYaP LcFEMXsrIkOsMDE2n5INwVt8eZk0a1XvvFq7v6jUj/I4inAMJ3AGHlxCHW6hAT4QYPAMr/DmC OfFeXc+5q0FJ585hD9wPn8A8rON/A==</latexit>
OSD2
<latexit sha1_base64="GtWpJrt8T9GVGRH Fs2AkaY0izWk=">AAAB7HicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+Vb0IXoJF8FR2q6DHgh68WdFtC+1Ssmm2D U2yS5IVytLf4MWDIl79Qd78N6btHrT1wcDjvRlm5oUJZ9q47rdTWFldW98obpa2tnd298r7B0 0dp4pQn8Q8Vu0Qa8qZpL5hhtN2oigWIaetcHQ99VtPVGkWy0czTmgg8ECyiBFsrOTfPdz0ar1 yxa26M6Bl4uWkAjkavfJXtx+TVFBpCMdadzw3MUGGlWGE00mpm2qaYDLCA9qxVGJBdZDNjp2 gU6v0URQrW9Kgmfp7IsNC67EIbafAZqgXvan4n9dJTXQVZEwmqaGSzBdFKUcmRtPPUZ8pSgwf W4KJYvZWRIZYYWJsPiUbgrf48jJp1qreebV2f1GpH+VxFOEYTuAMPLiEOtxCA3wgwOAZXuHNk c6L8+58zFsLTj5zCH/gfP4A9DeN/Q==</latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>  
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>
 
<latexit sha1_base64="X6q3ojHx Gk1WWjEVi5nAU07Lsf4=">AAAB7HicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1YvgZbEInkpSB T0WvHisYNpCG8pmu2mXbjZhdyKU0N/gxYMiXv1B3vw3btsctPXBwOO9GWbm hakUBl3321lb39jc2i7tlHf39g8OK0fHLZNkmnGfJTLRnZAaLoXiPgqUvJN qTuNQ8nY4vpv57SeujUjUI05SHsR0qEQkGEUr+b2QI+1Xqm7NnYOsEq8gVS jQ7Fe+eoOEZTFXyCQ1puu5KQY51SiY5NNyLzM8pWxMh7xrqaIxN0E+P3ZKL qwyIFGibSkkc/X3RE5jYyZxaDtjiiOz7M3E/7xuhtFtkAuVZsgVWyyKMkkw IbPPyUBozlBOLKFMC3srYSOqKUObT9mG4C2/vEpa9Zp3Vas/XFcbp0UcJTi Dc7gED26gAffQBB8YCHiGV3hzlPPivDsfi9Y1p5g5gT9wPn8AuIKOfg==</ latexit>
↵
<latexit sha1_base64="buaEuk7C kP0cltKsJMeYjjbibVk=">AAAB7XicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ql4EL8EieCpJF fRY8OKxgv2ANpTJdtOu3eyG3Y1QQv+DFw+KePX/ePPfuG1z0NYHA4/3ZpiZ FyacaeN5305hbX1jc6u4XdrZ3ds/KB8etbRMFaFNIrlUnRA15UzQpmGG006 iKMYhp+1wfDvz209UaSbFg5kkNIhxKFjECBortXrIkxH2yxWv6s3hrhI/Jx XI0eiXv3oDSdKYCkM4at31vcQEGSrDCKfTUi/VNEEyxiHtWiowpjrI5tdO3 XOrDNxIKlvCuHP190SGsdaTOLSdMZqRXvZm4n9eNzXRTZAxkaSGCrJYFKXc NdKdve4OmKLE8IklSBSzt7pkhAqJsQGVbAj+8surpFWr+pfV2v1VpX6Sx1G EUziDC/DhGupwBw1oAoFHeIZXeHOk8+K8Ox+L1oKTzxzDHzifP4AtjvI=</ latexit>
DS2
<latexit sha1_base64="Mcmyk6QT Wa6PFjNNeJO1n5x7T58=">AAAB63icbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+Vb0IXoJF8FR2W 0GPBT14rGg/oF1KNs22oUl2SbJCWfoXvHhQxKt/yJv/xmy7B219MPB4b4aZ eUHMmTau++0U1tY3NreK26Wd3b39g/LhUVtHiSK0RSIeqW6ANeVM0pZhhtN urCgWAaedYHKT+Z0nqjSL5KOZxtQXeCRZyAg2mXT7MKgNyhW36s6BVomXkw rkaA7KX/1hRBJBpSEca93z3Nj4KVaGEU5npX6iaYzJBI9oz1KJBdV+Or91h s6tMkRhpGxJg+bq74kUC62nIrCdApuxXvYy8T+vl5jw2k+ZjBNDJVksChOO TISyx9GQKUoMn1qCiWL2VkTGWGFibDwlG4K3/PIqadeqXr1au7+sNE7yOIp wCmdwAR5cQQPuoAktIDCGZ3iFN0c4L86787FoLTj5zDH8gfP5A1ZGjaQ=</ latexit>DS1
<latexit sha1_base64="135APMqE /Ikfm+C3iDYBGcelL5A=">AAAB63icbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+Vb0IXoJF8FR2W 0GPBT14rGg/oF1KNs22oUl2SbJCWfoXvHhQxKt/yJv/xmy7B219MPB4b4aZ eUHMmTau++0U1tY3NreK26Wd3b39g/LhUVtHiSK0RSIeqW6ANeVM0pZhhtN urCgWAaedYHKT+Z0nqjSL5KOZxtQXeCRZyAg2mXT7MPAG5YpbdedAq8TLSQ VyNAflr/4wIomg0hCOte55bmz8FCvDCKezUj/RNMZkgke0Z6nEgmo/nd86Q +dWGaIwUrakQXP190SKhdZTEdhOgc1YL3uZ+J/XS0x47adMxomhkiwWhQlH JkLZ42jIFCWGTy3BRDF7KyJjrDAxNp6SDcFbfnmVtGtVr16t3V9WGid5HEU 4hTO4AA+uoAF30IQWEBjDM7zCmyOcF+fd+Vi0Fpx85hj+wPn8AVTCjaM=</ latexit>
: Prior health belieff
<latexit sha1_base64="Crwp gbsAyi9asQZK7BnBTQs7Ujw=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/ qh69LBbBU0mqoMeCF48t2A9oQ9lsJ+3azSbsboQS+gu8eFDEqz/ Jm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8IBFcG9f9dgobm1vbO8Xd0t7+weFR+f ikreNUMWyxWMSqG1CNgktsGW4EdhOFNAoEdoLJ3dzvPKHSPJYP ZpqgH9GR5CFn1FipGQ7KFbfqLkDWiZeTCuRoDMpf/WHM0gilYYJ q3fPcxPgZVYYzgbNSP9WYUDahI+xZKmmE2s8Wh87IhVWGJIyVL WnIQv09kdFI62kU2M6ImrFe9ebif14vNeGtn3GZpAYlWy4KU0FM TOZfkyFXyIyYWkKZ4vZWwsZUUWZsNiUbgrf68jpp16reVbXWvK7 USR5HEc7gHC7Bgxuowz00oAUMEJ7hFd6cR+fFeXc+lq0FJ585h T9wPn8AwgWMzA==</latexit>
: Path availability
Factor functions model
C2
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Figure 7. An illustration of the FG model. Only the paths C1 to
OSD1, and C2 to OSD2 are shown, for clarity. Redundancies and
other network components have also been removed for clarity.
Thus, the path availability AP must explicitly model such
redundancies (e.g., LNETs and HA-pairs) while estimating
the availability of a path.
The model described above can be represented using a
factor graph that models the interactions between different
random variables (shown as circles) and functional relation-
ships known as Factor Functions (shown as dark boxes).
Figure 7 shows a part of the FG that models 1) the health
of components that lie on the path of <C1, OSD1> and <C2,
OSD2>, 2) path availability for these components, and 3)
OSD availability. The components OSD1, OSD2, DS1, and
DS2 form an HA group (§3.1). The circles in the FG rep-
resent random variables (e.g., a component’s health). The
factor functions, represented by squares, encapsulate the
relationships among the random variables. The singleton
factor functions fi encapsulates the prior belief of the health
of the component, which is given by the Beta distribution
(see above). The multivariate factor function h models the
number of successful Store-Pings on a path, which is given
by the binomial distribution (see above).
Inference. With HCFG, we can calculate the health of each
component Xi in the system. The expected health of a com-
ponent i can be estimated as E[Xi |Yp1 ,Yp2 ,Yp3 , ...]. Observa-
tions (Yp1 ,Yp2 ,Yp3 , ...) and the prior belief of the health of
components (α and β for each Xi ) are needed at epoch Tj .
Ypi is measured by the number of observed successful Store-
Pings during a specified interval, and α and β are obtained
from the inference result at the previous epoch.
We solve the inference task using the Monte Carlo Markov
Chain (MCMC) algorithm [55]. MCMC is a technique that
can be used to estimate the expectation of a statistic from a
complex distribution (in this case, E[Xi |YP1 ,YP2 ,YP3 , ...]) by
generating a large number of samples from the model and
directly estimating the statistic.
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4.3 Failure Diagnosis
After identifying an unhealthy component, Kaleidoscope
further pinpoints the causes, including component failures
(§3.3.1) or resource overloads (§3.3.2). Kaleidoscope pinpoints
the corresponding error logs for component failures, and the
corresponding load metrics for resource overloads.
The root cause analysis is based on a statistical method.
Our key insight is that unhealthy components and their
healthy counterparts behave differently. For example, we
expect all data servers that belong to the same file system
to generate similar error logs over a time window. However,
when a server is unhealthy that group it generates unique
patterns of error logs.
Attributing the cause to overloads. We collect the follow-
ing monitoring data (§4.1.3) to identify resource overloads
as the cause:
• loadavg on the data and metadata servers which captures
the load on a server at 5-minute intervals;
• await time of disk devices, which captures the average
service time (in milliseconds) taken by a disk device to
serve an I/O request; and
• utilization of disk devices, which captures the bandwidth
saturation of a disk device.
Kaleidoscope runs a local outlier factor (LOF) anomaly de-
tection algorithm [17] on a homogeneous group of storage
components. The LOF is based on the concept of a local den-
sity, where locality is given by k-nearest neighbors, whose
distance is used to estimate the density. By comparing the lo-
cal density of an object to the local densities of its neighbors,
one can identify regions of similar density, and points that
have a substantially lower density than their neighbors, and
thus are considered to be outliers. We chose LOF because
storage components within a homogeneous group may have
different modes of operation. Such modes are not indicative
of any degradation. For example, in the production data, we
found cases when k data servers had low loadavg (<10) and
N −k data servers had high loadavg (>64). However, if there
is a data server whose loadavg is significantly higher than
both of those modes of operation, that is indicative of the
problem. A similar methodology is adopted for disk devices
by using the await and utilization metric.
Attributing the causes to component failures. Compo-
nent failures are attributed based on log analysis. Kaleido-
scope collects error logs from all the components of the
storage subsystem (§4.1.3). The error logs generated by the
unhealthy components are compared to the error logs of
healthy components, δ = LUO − ⋃
i ∈HO
Li , where L represents
the log set, UO represents unhealthy components, and HO
represents healthy components. If δ , ∅, then δ is provided
as evidence, and the unhealthy status is attributed to com-
ponent failures. Note that Kaleidoscope processes the raw
logs and curates them into a normalized form that captures
the triggering events of the logs by filtering out time- and
node-specific metadata. It does so using regular expression
based log processing tools [68] based on filters provided by
production facilities for the Lustre file system. Despite its
simplicity, we find that the statistics-based log analysis is
very effective and scalable in pinpointing the log entries that
indicate the failure causes, as shown in our evaluation.
Note that Kaleidoscope could report the likely causes of
IO failures to be marked as both component failures (by logs)
and resource overloads (by metrics).
4.4 Implementation and Deployment
Kaleidoscope has been deployed in PetaStore. We placed
monitors on clients that (1) have different underlying system
stacks (e.g., kernel versions), (2) are physically located on
different networks, and (3) execute different services (e.g.,
scheduling, user login, and data moving). Specifically, we
placed monitors on all the service nodes (64 nodes) that
provide scheduling and other services, import/export (I/E)
nodes that help move bulk data into and out of the storage
system (25 nodes), and login nodes (4 nodes) that users use
to launch applications. The I/E nodes and login nodes are lo-
cated on the storage network, whereas the service nodes are
located on the proprietary compute network fabric. However,
in production, at any given time, Store-Pings are executed
from (1) all login nodes, (2) 1 out of 64 service nodes chosen
randomly, and (3) 1 out of 25 I/E nodes4 chosen randomly.
This probing plan not only satisfies our minimal probing
plan for inferring storage system health, but also provides
reliability of monitoring infrastructure itself. That is, in case
of a client-failure another client can be chosen as a monitor.
Store-pings are executed every minute for each OSD, data
server and metadata server. For data and metadata servers,
the Store-Pings use the same Lustre APIs used for writing
to disk, but instead create/read/write to the memory of the
server. This results in 72 CrWr (6 clients × 6 metadata servers
and 6metadata OSDs), 72 RmEx (6 clients× 6metadata servers
and 6 metadata OSDs) and 5,184 WrEx (6 clients × 432 data
servers and 432 OSDs) requests/minute. To get determin-
istic measurement paths for Store-Pings between the two
members of each <monitor, OSD> pair, we use setstripe
of Lustre to create a unique file on each OSD for a client.
The Store-Ping-basedmonitoring is implemented in Python
and scheduled using Jenkins [2]. The Store-Pings are con-
figured to run at one minute intervals with a timeout of
30 seconds for each I/O request. The failure localization
module is implemented using PyMC3 [60], a Python-based
probabilistic programming language. The failure localization
module uses samples collected over five minutes; thus, it
uses data from 26,640 I/O requests for inference. Finally, the
4I/E nodes are the import export nodes that are used to move data in and
out of the PetaStore.
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diagnosis methodology was implemented in Python using
the Scipy [37] and Baler [68] libraries.
5 Evaluation
We evaluated Kaleidoscope using 843 production issues re-
solved by the PetaStore operators over a span of two years
(Dec. 1, 2016 to Nov. 30, 2018.). Each of the 843 issues has a
report with manual categorizations that we refer to as the
ground truth. As Kaleidoscope has been deployed for more
than two years, we used Kaleidoscope to do live forensics
(triage and root-cause analysis) for each of the issues. As
discussed in §5.1, Kaleidoscope reports far more issues than
the 843 found but it is up to the operators to decide whether
to investigate a particular issue, based on its severity, job
priority, and communications with customers.
5.1 Overall Results
Table 3 presents the effectiveness of Kaleidoscope in triaging
the failing components (§4.2) and pinpointing their root
causes (§4.3). We can see that Kaleidoscope can localize the
unhealthy components, caused by failures or overload, for
99.3% of the production issues (837 out of 843). Only six out
of 843 were not detected by Kaleidoscope. We find none of
the six issues had any impact on the I/O completion time.
All six issues belonged to disk drive failures. Those failures
were recorded and flagged for repairs to avoid RAID failures.
Among the 843 production issues, 346 were caused by
component failures and 497 were caused by resource over-
load, as discussed in §3.3.1 and §3.3.2, respectively. As shown
in Table 3, Kaleidoscope was able to correctly identify the
root causes of 98.3% of the issues caused by component fail-
ures. In addition to correctly associating the root cause of
and issue to a failure, it presented system managers with
the error logs corresponding to the failure. For overload is-
sues, Kaleidoscope was able to correctly associate the root
causes of 94.2% of the issues (468 of 497) while incorrectly
attributing the remaining 29 issues to component failures.
The reason is that the 29 overload issues coincidently had
random noises in the logs, which confused Kaleidoscope.
In addition to the 843 known issues, Kaleidoscope found
another 25,753 I/O failure events. Figure 8 shows the his-
togram of the durations of these I/O failures. As shown in
the figure, 6073 of 26,596 I/O failures lasted for more than
5 minutes; 1,773 lasted for more than 20 minutes; and 1,026
lasted for 30+ minutes. We find that the 843 reported cases
mostly fall into the range of 20–30 minutes. Typically, oper-
ators focus only on issues that last for 30 minutes.
Our interactions with PetaStore’s operators told us that
the Store-Ping-based monitoring helped them understand
the tail latency and performance variation in real time. Op-
erators can detect performance regression by comparing
the measurements from different points of time. Figure 9
shows the latency measurement histogram (plotted as a line
True Positive False Negative Total
Component Triage (Total: 843)
837 (99.3%) 6 (0.7%) 843
Root-cause Analysis (Total: 843)
(Failure) 340 (98.3%) 6 (1.7%) 346
(Overload) 468 (94.2%) 29 (5.8%) 497
Table 3. Effectiveness (measured by true positives) of Kaleido-
scope’s triage and root-cause analysis.
100
101
102
103
104
105
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
 1200
 1400
C
ou
nt
Event Duration [min(s)]
Figure 8. Histogram of duration of components in unhealthy state.
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Figure 9. Completion time of I/O requests measured by Kaleido-
scope’s WrEx Store-Pings.
with every 20 points on the graph) for the WrEx Store-Pings.
(We omit RmEx and CrWr because of the page limit.) We can
see that 99% of WrEx completed within one second (SLO),
and only 0.14% failed with a timeout. With Kaleidoscope, it
is efficient to nail down to the anomalies and perform live
forensics (e.g., the load-related resource overload condition
discussed in §3.2).
5.2 False Positives and Incorrect Diagnosis
It is challenging to measure the false positives of Kaleido-
scope, as there are no ground truth data; an issue tagged by
Kaleidoscope as not being resolved could come from different
reasons (e.g., low priority jobs).
To estimate the false-positive ratio, we randomly selected
100 issues reported by Kaleidoscope: 50 from the “component
failure” category and 50 from the “overload” category. Kalei-
doscope was able to localize all cases correctly. However, it
10
Kaleidoscope 100 monitors 6 monitors
Mean Std Mean Std
Off 100 0.15 100 0.13
On 97.58 0.32 99.99 0.12
Table 4. Impact of 100 Store-Ping monitors running at 30 second
interval on IOR benchmark [5] for stress testing. The mean value
of I/O throughput with no Kaleidoscope is normalized to 100.
failed to identify the root causes of four (out of 100) cases.
Our further investigation showed that the false positives
were due to the propagation delay between the occurrence
of the internal faults at the server side and their manifesta-
tion as I/O failures. Such time misalignments are expected
in a production system, and Kaleidoscope currently does not
model them.
5.3 Monitoring Overhead
We use the IOR benchmark [5] to measure the monitoring
overhead in a worst-case scenario. The measurement uses
stress testing to max out the throughput offered by PetaS-
tore. IOR was running on 4,320 compute nodes during this
measurement. Table 4 shows the monitoring overhead intro-
duced by Store-Pings when (a) 100 monitors were running at
30 second interval and (b) 6 monitors were running at one-
minute interval. Store-Pings decreased mean throughput
only by < 0.01% in PetaStore’s production settings. However,
scaling to 100 monitors and increasing the frequency by 2×
would decreases the throughput by less than 2.42%. Note that
the average throughput in production is significantly below
the peak throughput under the stress test. We also measured
the time difference between the launch of Store-Pings for a
given interval and found that all Store-Pings were launched
within 10 seconds of each other and 98.4% were launched
within 3 seconds of each other.
5.4 Simulation
Before deploying Kaleidoscope in production, we built a
trace-based simulator based on PetaStore’s topology to ex-
tensively evaluate the localization and root cause analysis.We
ran 1,000 simulation experiments. In each experiment, the
simulator injected faults based on the distributions of comple-
tion time characterized in §3.2 to simulate both component
failures and overload.
In 1,000 simulation experiments, when the simulator in-
jected exactly two faults (one component failure and one
overload), Kaleidoscope detected these cases with no false
positives. We then increased the number of simultaneous
faults to 20 for failures and overloads. With 40 faults, in
the worst case, Kaleidoscope generated 4 false positives and
found all the injected faults (recall of 1.0). Kaleidoscope per-
formed particularly well in the simulations because the sim-
ulated faults have immediate manifestation and less noise.
5.5 Kaleidoscope in Action
We use real I/O failures to illustrate Kaleidoscope in action.
Fig. 10 uses a heatmap to depict a failure impact on data
servers. Each heatmap shows the ratio of operations that
took longer than 1 second to the total number of operations
issued during 5 minutes interval by a given client (y-axis) to
each data server from Scratch, Home, and Projects domains
(x-axis). Scratch, Home, and Projects are three file systems in
PetaStore. Clients 0, 1, and 2 are the login nodes on Ethernet
network, client 3 gives an aggregated view of all 25 IE nodes
on Infiniband network, and client 4 provides an aggregated
view of all 64 service nodes on compute network.
Fig. 10a shows a case of two failures that occur concur-
rently in the storage system: (i) a load issue on scratch data
server 208 and (ii) an outage of projects file system metadata
server. The heat map in Fig. 10a shows that both scratch
and home data servers are healthy for most part with ex-
ception of the scratch data server 208. Data server-208 is
unhealthy as all clients have trouble completing I/O requests
within 1s. The heatmap for projects file system indicates a
wide-spread outage that could be caused by network-wide
issue, metadata server outage, or concurrent outage on all
36 LNET nodes connecting clients to projects file system. As
Kaleidoscope shows that scratch and home data servers are
functioning properly, network-wide issue is improbable as
they all share the same network. It is also highly unlikely
that 36 LNET concurrently fail. Therefore, by elimination,
we conclude that the observed outage would only be caused
by an issue with: (i) projects file system metadata server or
(ii) the 2 LNETs serving the metadata server.
The heatmap in Fig. 10b shows that all requests from
aggregated view of client 4 are failing (or took longer than 1s)
across all data servers. The ratio of 1.0 across all data servers
is a clear indication of a network-wide outage. In case of
IE nodes (i.e., Client 3), one of the clients is having trouble
accessing the OSDs across all data servers as indicated by
the grayish pattern on the heatmap. From the heatmap alone
it is unclear whether the issue was caused by a bad LNET
node or the client itself. However, it is possible to diagnose
the problem by looking at the topology of the system to rule
out contribution of LNET or client for failing I/O requests.
In both cases, Kaleidoscope provides correct localization
and diagnosis. Kaleidoscope provides only relevant visual-
izations after localization between OSD and clients as the
evidence, instead of generating visualizations for all possible
combinations (e.g., LNET and clients).
6 Discussion and Limitations
Kaleidoscope is designed with an emphasis on practicality
and scalability, without a desire to be 100% accurate. As
we show in §5.2, Kaleidoscope occasionally introduces false
positives and incorrectly diagnoses due to not modeling
the propagation delay between the cause and the impact.
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Figure 10. Outages visible from Kaleidoscope
We show that the false positive ratio is very low, and our
interactions with PetaStore operators confirm its usefulness.
One potential caveat is that Kaleidoscope assumes that
Store-Pings experiences the same I/O behavior as real ap-
plications, which may not hold in all cases. On the other
hand, using Kaleidoscope ML-components retrospectively
on trace-data generated by Store-Ping monitors show that
ML-methods captured majority of the failure and resource
contention problems (see §5).
Note that different applications may require different re-
quirements of I/O completion time. For example, some appli-
cations are more tolerable to slow I/O response. Kaleidoscope
does not understand application-level semantics but uses a
system-wide threshold based on the service-level agreement
(one second for PetaStore). An alternative we considered was
an approach that inserts Store-Pings in the I/O path of the
applications by automatic binary instrumentation or source
code analysis. However, we find that this is not feasible in
data center settings such as PetaStore, in which we have
little control over applications, not to mention the concerns
of correctness and performance overhead.
In the deployment at PetaStore, Kaleidoscope detects er-
rors at the granularity of meta-data servers, data servers,
LNET and object store devices. It cannot detect finer grained
faults such as section errors [13, 62]. It currently can only
localize a network outage related I/O failure, instead of the
specific network router, due to the randomness in network
routing decisions. This is a deployment decision rather than a
fundamental limitation of the methodology. To have more in-
sights into the network, one can enhance the probes in Kalei-
doscope based on network tomography [9, 26, 29, 70, 77].
Note that doing this brings benefits over existing network
tomography [9, 26, 29, 70, 77] as Kaleidoscope provides more
and stronger capability (e.g., disambiguiting loads and fail-
ures) as discussed in §2.
7 Related Work
A number of efforts have been made to characterize and
understand failures of individual hardware components (e.g.,
disks [13–15, 57, 62, 63], memory [51, 54, 64, 65, 67], and oth-
ers [36]) as well as file systems [7, 25, 27, 48, 56, 58, 59]).
Compared with failure studies of individual storage sys-
tem components, little prior work analyzed reliability of
distributed file and storage systems. Ford et al. [24] char-
acterizes the availability of Google’s storage systems, with
a focus on correlated failures. Our study is fundamentally
different and complementary to the prior work. Our study
characterizes the manifestation of both component failures
and resource overload as performance issues.
Kaleidoscope is built upon the wealth body of work on
failure detection [6, 21, 30, 33, 34, 45, 47]. In §2.1, we discuss
the failure patterns that cannot be handled by the state-of-
the-art failure detection methods. Panorama [33] enhances
observability to detect gray failures by inserting failure re-
porting code at observation points in the software programs.
Kaleidoscope shares the same insight as Panorama that the
ability of observing the system from the viewpoint of the
clients is a necessity for monitoring complex distributed
systems. On the other hand, we show that certain failure pat-
terns cannot be detected by Panorama-like approach if they
do not trigger exceptions in the client code. Kaleidoscope
proactively probes the system to build observability with the
goal of preventing client-perceived issues in the first place.
Active measurement has been used for networks moni-
toring and fault localization [29, 70, 77]. Pingmesh [29] asks
every server in a data center to ping each other and uses
the aggregated ping data for network latency analysis. Net-
Bouncer [70] leverages the IP-in-IP protocol supported by
modern switches to actively probe selected network paths to
pinpoint the faulty links and devices. Deepview [77] lever-
ages monitoring data to diagnose virtual disk failures by
triaging the root causes into compute, network, or stor-
age tiers (it treats the entire storage cluster as a black box).
Kaleidoscope fundamentally differs from the aforementioned
methods in at least two aspects: 1) Kaleidoscope is the first
effort for monitoring large-scale distributed file systems and
the underlying storage infrastructure; 2) Kaleidoscope is able
to differentiate reliability issues and performance issues—as
discussed in §2.1, none of the network monitoring approach
considers resource overload and contention; and 3) Kaleido-
scope goes beyond a failure localization tool but can further
pinpoint the root causes inside the unhealthy components.
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8 Conclusion
Our study shows that reliability and performance are inter-
related as component failures and resource contention both
lead to I/O timeouts or slowdown which is hard to disam-
biguate. This paper advocates the need for identifying and
diagnosing resource overload and reliability failures jointly
to effectively coordinate recovery strategy. We build Kalei-
doscope and deploy it on a peta-scale production system.
Our evaluation and experience show that Kaleidoscope is
effective in providing live forensic support for large-scale
distributed systems with negligible overhead.
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